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Conference Foreword 
This is the sixth year that the Australian Digital Forensics Conference has been held under the 
banner of the Security Research Institute, which is in part due to the success of the security 
conference program at ECU. As with previous years, the conference continues to see a quality 
papers with a number from local and international authors.  8 papers were submitted and following 
a double blind peer review process, 5 were accepted for final presentation and publication.  
Conferences such as these are simply not possible without willing volunteers who follow through 
with the commitment they have initially made, and I would like to take this opportunity to thank the 
conference committee for their tireless efforts in this regard. These efforts have included but not 
been limited to the reviewing and editing of the conference papers, and helping with the planning, 
organisation and execution of the conference. Particular thanks go to those international reviewers 
who took the time to review papers for the conference, irrespective of the fact that they are unable 
to attend this year.  
To our sponsors and supporters a vote of thanks for both the financial and moral support provided 
to the conference. Finally, to the student volunteers and staff of the ECU Security Research Institute, 
your efforts as always are appreciated and invaluable. 
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Conference Chair 
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Director, Security Research Institute 
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A FRAMEWORK FOR FORENSIC RECONSTRUCTION OF 
SPONTANEOUS AD HOC NETWORKS 
 
Alastair Nisbet 
Security & Forensics Research Group, Information Technology & Software Engineering Department 
Auckland University of Technology, Auckland, New Zealand 
anisbet@aut.ac.nz 
 
Abstract 
Spontaneous ad hoc networks are distinguished by rapid deployment for a specific purpose, with no forward 
planning or pre-design in their topology. Often these networks will spring up through necessity whenever a 
network is required urgently but briefly. This may be in a disaster recovery setting, military uses where often the 
network is unplanned but the devices are pre-installed with security settings, educational networks or networks 
created as a one-off for a meeting such as in a business organisation. Generally, wireless networks pose 
problems for forensic investigators because of the open nature of the medium, but if logging procedures and pre-
planned connections are in place, past messages, including nefarious activity can often be easily traced through 
normal forensic practices. However, the often urgent nature of the spontaneous ad hoc communication 
requirements of these networks leads to the acceptance onto the network of anyone with a wireless device. 
Additionally, the identity of the network members, their location and the numbers within the network are all 
unknown. With no centre of control of the network, such as a central server or wireless access point, the ability 
to forensically reconstruct the network topology and trace a malicious message or other inappropriate or 
criminal activity would seem impossible. This research aims to demonstrate that forensic reconstruction is 
possible in these types of networks and the current research provides initial results for how forensic 
investigators can best undertake these investigations.      
 
Keywords: spontaneous, wireless, wifi, MANET, simulation, forensic investigations 
INTRODUCTION 
With the introduction in 1997 of the original IEEE 802.11 wireless networking standard, wireless 
communication ‘came of age’. Whilst other, more basic attempts at wireless networking had been developed, the 
IEEE suite of standards that sprang from the original 2Mbps standard has seen steady advances in throughput, 
security and usability. Whilst originally envisaged as extensions to existing wired networks by utilising wireless 
access points, a distinct type of network that departed from using access points was quickly developed. This ad 
hoc mode allowed users of often mobile devices to connect directly to one another’s devices to form a mesh 
network that could be used in a truly peer to peer fashion. The main advantage was the ability to quickly connect 
to each other’s devices without the need for a preconfigured access point to act as the centre of control for the 
network (Kuo, Chu 2016). The rapid deployment of ad hoc networks meant that not only pre-planned networks 
with pre-configured devices could form this topology, but that unplanned networks could also be created on-the-
fly for a very specific and often urgent need (Nelson, Steckler et al. 2011). This gives great potential to this type 
of truly ad hoc network, often referred to as spontaneous networks, but as yet this potential remains largely 
untapped. With concerns over security, especially with unplanned networks which may allow any person with a 
device to connect without the need for authorisation or authentication, these networks are used rarely. However, 
in the past few years the benefits of quick and unplanned network formation are being discussed and security 
implementations are proposed that have the potential to make even totally unplanned networks have robust 
security (Lacuesta, Lloret et al. 2013).  
One area that has been left out of these discussions and proposed security protocols is that of forensic 
reconstructions of the networks to trace misbehaving devices. Forensics plays a vital part in seeing the potential 
of computers and networks utilised because it allows misbehaviour to have a consequence, that of identifying the 
nefarious device and user and bringing them to account for their behaviour. This research examines the issue of 
forensic reconstruction of spontaneous ad hoc networks and introduces unique research into how forensic 
investigators can use techniques which will allow them to trace the origins of misbehaviour back to the 
originating device. Initial results are discussed and a guide as to how these techniques will be further developed 
to provide practical implementations of forensic investigations are made. 
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STATE OF THE ART 
On the 14th of September 1999, the two extensions to the original standard provided a security protocol built into 
the standard which was seen as a significant step forward in acceptance of wireless networking. The 802.11a and 
802.11b protocols also greatly increased the throughput from a maximum of 2Mbps to 54Mbps and 11Mbps 
respectively (IEEE 1999). Whilst the security in the form of WEP proved to have serious flaws which would 
later be rectified in the form of WPA and WPA2, the increased bandwidth had an immediate and significant 
effect (Cam-Winget, Housley et al. 2003 ). Not only did it provide much increased packet throughput, often 
greater than what was being provided on the LAN at the time, but it meant that an ad hoc networking topology 
was much more usable (Wang, Wang et al. 2005). This is because in a mesh network, there are often devices 
communicating at the same time in pairs and within the radio range of other communicating devices. The high 
bandwidth meant multiple message passing could be carried out with an acceptable bandwidth, even with the 
interference caused to each other’s radio signals. Later, bandwidth would be significantly increased in later 
revisions to the standard so that today we enjoy bandwidths up to 150Mbps or more in ad hoc networking mode 
(IEEE 2009). The increasing acceptance of mesh networking, including unplanned spontaneous networks has 
seen increased awareness of security issues, especially in the form of cryptography with the associated 
encryption key management challenges. Whilst these are being overcome as new ideas lead to improved 
protocols, the forensics of spontaneous networks has largely been ignored.  
Digital forensics traditionally utilises a life cycle of 4 phases (NIST 2006). These phases are shown in figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The Digital Forensic Life Cycle 
The phases begin by seizing a device, often a computer but possibly other hardware such as a router, switch or 
wireless access point. In many cases these devices will have logs that will record much of the network traffic that 
has passed through the device. Whilst configuration of the devices may not include collecting all packets, source 
and destination address and often some identifying packet information such as headers may be recorded. This 
can be invaluable information for a forensic investigator who may be building a case against a misbehaving user 
such as an errant employee in a company or an outsider intruding into a company network. Serious offences may 
be committed with unauthorised access, use of resources or destruction of data. Many of the offences relating to 
computer crimes are now contained in New Zealand’s Crimes Amendment Act 2003 and include harsh penalties 
for such behaviour. Most other countries have similar legislation with harsh penalties including long prison 
terms.  
However, the investigation often relies on the ability to seize the offending device and perform an acquisition 
and analysis of the evidence on this device. Whilst monitoring network traffic may be possible in wired 
networks, this is not practical in a spontaneous wireless network (N. Malik, J Chandramouli et al. 2017). 
Network logs, if they exist on the device, may point to the errant device and provide corroborating evidence of 
the misbehaviour. However, in spontaneous networks where network deployment has no prior planning and 
often no prior notice of its formation, this first step may prove to be impossible. This is because the users of the 
network are usually not identified, their devices are not registered for use on the network, their location may 
change as they move around the network and they may come and go as mobile devices are shut down to save 
battery power and restarted later to join the network multiple times. Additionally, a node that may be monitoring 
traffic has a radio range of approximately 300 metres and therefore may be out of range of most of the network. 
If misbehaviour is detected, there may be the ability to eject a device from the network by revoking a digital 
certificate (Nisbet, 2014), but attempting to physically locate the device to perform a forensic examination may 
be unsuccessful (Zhang, Lee et al. 2003). This could be especially true if the user of the device is aware that their 
device is being sought.  
What is required is a method of reconstructing the network at a particular time in its life so that the forensic 
reconstruction can be performed, possibly without access to the offending device. This research demonstrates 
through simulation that this type of reconstruction may be possible provided some of the devices in the network 
can be examined. Additionally, the type and amount of information that can be realistically logged onto the 
devices is discussed so that an initial guideline can be made as to what percentage of devices in the network are 
needed to be examined given these varying parameters. The following section discusses the challenges inherent 
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in forensic evidence gathering from spontaneous network deployment, especially when evidence may be 
required long after the network has served its purpose and disbanded. 
FORENSIC RECONSTRUCTION 
In a truly ad hoc network, a mesh network will often form where many of the devices in the network, referred to 
as nodes, will have one or more neighbours within direct communication distance. This not only allows 
neighbours to communicate directly with each other, but they can often be used as hopping points for messages 
to greatly increase the distance of the network communication from the usual 300 metres radio range, to in 
theory unlimited distances (Nisbet and Rashid 2009). One other benefit of multiple neighbours is that the path 
utilised to send a message can have many different possible paths from sender to receiver (Suzuki, Kaneko et al. 
2006). This redundancy of routes greatly increases the efficiency of message passing and is one significant 
benefit of mesh networks, but when these networks have at least some nodes that are mobile, the message paths 
may also change rapidly. This requires a very efficient reactive routing protocol that will find a path through 
multiple hopping points from sender to receiver, often in both directions if a reply is given as the same route 
back to the sender may not exist by the time the message is received. This means that routes are changing rapidly 
as are neighbours and often locations of nodes. This all adds to the considerable complexity of these types of 
networks and the forensic challenges that stem from these temporal and spatial changes (Dewald 2015).  
The current research is in the development phase of initial testing through simulations. A wireless network 
simulator was constructed utilising Matlab and has been modified to permit nodes in the network to record 
certain parameters which can then be called upon to attempt to rebuild the network. The process involves 
deployment of an ad hoc network where the nodes are placed at random on a grid and the network grows as time 
passes. This simulates the spontaneous deployment of an ad hoc network for any purpose where people have 
begun communicating with neighbours. Whilst the purpose of deployment of the network is unimportant, it 
could be for such urgent and unplanned reasons such as when a major disaster has struck knocking out 
communications or some similar event that requires wireless communication by masses of devices (Shimoda and 
Gyoda 2011). The network grows as more and more people joint the networks, with some leaving the network 
temporarily, perhaps to save battery power on their devices, and others joining at apparent random points on the 
grid. During the time the simulated network is ‘live’, nodes will appear at random points with some nodes 
mobile and some shutting down temporarily or permanently.  
The network simulation runs for a simulation time of 10 minutes which is sufficient with the growth to mimic 
perhaps several hours in real time. During this time, information is recorded on each node as to its current status, 
location and the source and destination of any messages that it may send, pass on or receive. One issue here is 
that recording of information may be desirable but with limited time to record data and limited storage available 
on many devices, it is necessary to store as little information as is necessary. Therefore, the simulation utilises 
the ability to call only some or all of the information recorded. This parameter will allow comparisons to be 
made as to what information is necessary and what difference not having some information will make to the 
success of a reconstruction.  The information recorded in the nodes is shown in table 1. 
 
Table 1: Information recorded in the nodes 
Attribute Format 
Live yes / no 
Neighbours node IDs 
Neighbour Location x and y coordinates 
Server yes / no 
Network Number integer 
Position x and y coordinates 
Once the simulation has completed, a time from 1 second to the end of the simulation is selected to attempt the 
reconstruction. This time represents when a malicious act has occurred and the offending node needs to be 
identified. For example, this may be an act such as a false message about rescue in a disaster area that may have 
led to serious injury or death. Each node records the information shown in table 1, along with other information 
related to security settings. It is unlikely that all devices that were in the network can be recovered. Here, a 
distinction needs to be drawn as to which devices qualify. Either it can be those devices that were live at the time 
the misbehaviour occurred or alternatively all devices that have ever appeared in the network. A call to those 
people who may have participated in the network may results in devices that were not live at the time of the 
misbehaviour and for this reason the reconstructions have chosen to include these ‘no longer live’ nodes. The 
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reconstruction of the networks begins with a variable parameter of what percentage of nodes were able to be 
recovered for examination. This could range from one device to all devices. Figure 1 shows a network that has 
grown over a period of 60 seconds and now contains a total of 24 nodes. What is interesting to note is that rather 
than a single network forming, 3 separate networks have formed independently. Of these, only the biggest 
network has reached a capacity where digital certificates can be issued, shown by the red labels on the nodes. 
The nodes out of 300 metre range of another node are shown isolated with a circle representing the 300 metre 
radio range. The 2 small networks at the bottom of the grid have 2 members each. This snapshot of the network 
is taken during the live network simulation. The goal is therefore to reconstruct the network well after the 
network has ceased and the nodes have disbanded. This must be achieved as accurately as possible so that nodes 
in the network can be identified and placed in their location at any chosen time, such as when a malicious 
message was sent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Spontaneous network at 60 seconds 
One challenge that is immediately apparent is that whilst the goal may be to identify a misbehaving node in a 
network, there is no record of the members of the network until devices that participated in the network have 
been examined (Graffi, Mogre et al. 2007). This leads to 2 desirable records that could be stored dynamically 
that would greatly assist the forensic investigator to reconstruct the network and trace the origin of the malicious 
message. The first is to identify and collect at least 1 member of the target network. The second is to have a 
record of all members who were in the network at the time recorded in every device in the network. This would 
mean that collecting any single device would give all information about the identities of all devices in the 
network. Here, identities simply refer to a unique identifier for the device but this would not include who was 
using the device. Additionally, the unique identifier, at least for the lifetime of the network, and the location of 
the device at the chosen time would not disclose any private information relating to the user of the device.  
This is an example of what would be most desirable and could be written into a protocol with forensic readiness 
in mind when designing the protocol. Without this preparedness, the investigator would need to collect as many 
devices as possible, possibly through advertising for network participants, and then analyse the devices initially 
to determine if they had belonged to the relevant network at the time of the offence. With the ability to store 
relevant forensic evidence within each of the network members’ devices, the network can be reconstructed by 
looking through the evidence of each collected node and placing nodes in the network space as they were at the 
chosen time. An example of this is 2 views of the network reconstructed in this manner and shown in figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Reconstruction of the network at 60 seconds 
A comparison with figure 2 shows that the reconstruction is successful. The target time is 60 seconds after the 
formation of the network, and this could represent a specific time when a malicious message was sent leading to 
serious consequences. The left side of this figure shows only those nodes that were live at the tick of the clock of 
60 seconds. The right figure shows all nodes live at 60 seconds and all nodes that were once live but are no 
longer live and are identified as black squares. This is an option that can be chosen and may be useful to 
determine any other nodes in the vicinity of the network that may still contain some evidence of the network 
members or malicious behaviour even though they had closed down by the time a malicious message was sent. 
 The example shows what can be done if either all nodes have been successfully gathered and their evidence 
examined, or some isolated nodes are gathered and at least some nodes in the main network in the middle are 
gathered and examined. Figure 4 shows a reconstruction of the network at 10, 30 and 50 seconds and 
demonstrates how the reconstruction time can be entered by the forensic investigator to display the network at 
any given time during its lifetime. The update period for the simulation is 1 second, so at any time during the life 
of the network, the reconstruction can be made and is accurate to within the 1 second update period. 
 
Figure 4: Reconstruction at 10, 30 and 50 seconds 
Whilst the goal for the forensic investigator is to collect 100% of the devices that existed in the network, it is 
more likely that only a percentage of nodes can be collected and the reconstruction is therefore attempted with 
this limited number of nodes. Here, the amount and type of information stored in the nodes makes a significant 
difference in the success of the reconstruction. Figure 5 shows a similar simulation run to 60 seconds 
representing approximately an hour or more for the network to form. In this figure, the reconstruction is run at 
the 60 second mark but a limited percentage of nodes were able to be collected. Nodes that had been present in 
the network previously but were not live at the target time are present as black squares. 
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Figure 5: Network at 60 seconds, reconstruction with 80%, 50%, 30%, 20% nodes 
It is apparent that relying solely on the node to be recovered to place it at the correct location in the network is 
problematic. Even with 80% of the total nodes recovered, there is no guarantee that this will equate to 80% of 
the nodes in the network of interest. If the target of the investigation is the network at centre left with 10 nodes, 
then the reconstruction with 80% of nodes recovered has in fact recovered only 50% of the nodes in this network 
although 80% are recovered overall. This is unlucky but a consequence of chance in recovering fewer than all 
the nodes.  
Rather than rely solely on each node’s information about itself, neighbouring nodes may have stored information 
that can be used to identify and place nodes on the grid that have not been successfully collected. This would 
mean that for the 5 nodes recovered from the target network, their logs which are recovered may contain 
sufficient information to place the remaining 5 nodes in their respective locations. If an investigation is tracing 
the origin of a malicious message, then the information required may be the path the message has taken which 
can then be traced from receiver to the nefarious sender. Acquiring the nodes utilised as hopping points for the 
message may not provide any more useful information, so that information about these nodes may be sufficient. 
This does however require that nodes collect and store the information in case a forensic investigation is 
undertaken later. The forensic readiness of the network could lead to a much more successful outcome by simply 
querying neighbours attributes on a regular basis and storing the information. At this stage of development, this 
has not been designed into the forensic protocol but will rather be the next stage of development for the forensic 
reconstruction simulation software.  
CONCLUSION 
Wherever a network is present, security and forensic readiness should be a major consideration. Preparing for the 
worst means that should some serious issue occurs that leads to the requirement for a forensic investigation of a 
spontaneous ad hoc network, the forensic investigator can have the best chance of the successful outcome of 
identifying the perpetrator by conducting a forensic investigation. It may be that serious misbehaviour in the 
network has led to serious injury or death with the only hope of identifying the perpetrator being the number of 
devices that can be recovered and the information that they contain. The development of protocols that allow for 
forensic readiness is something that has been largely ignored with the focus in the past more on security issues in 
these networks. The ability to reconstruct a spontaneous ad hoc network, possibly days or weeks after it has been 
disbanded is something that is urgently required by forensic investigators. The further development in this 
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research, it is hoped, will lead to better guidelines as to what information and what percentage of devices will 
likely be needed for successful forensic investigations. Further development will greatly enhance the protocol 
and provide results that can act as these guidelines.  
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Abstract 
Forensic investigations of digital media traditionally involve seizing a device and performing a forensic 
investigation. Often legal and physical obstructions must be overcome so that the investigator has access to the 
device and the right to secure it for investigation purposes. Taking a forensic image of a hard disk may need to 
be done in the field but analysis can usually be performed at a later time. With the rapid increase in hard disk 
size, the acquiring of a forensic image can take hours or days. This poses significant issues for forensic 
investigators when potential evidence resides in the cloud. What is highly desirable is the ability to perform the 
acquisition of the image and the data recovery whilst the data remains in the cloud. The comparatively small 
amount of recovered data can then be downloaded from the cloud. This may solve legal, time and physical 
obstacles with one relatively simple method. This research describes the development of cloud-based software to 
perform a digital forensic investigation in the cloud and describes the efficiency of the process under several 
different configurations utilising Amazon Web Services cloud solutions. 
 
Keywords: cloud, forensics, network security, investigation 
INTRODUCTION 
As the increase in Internet speeds has seen rapid growth, the uptake of basing data in the cloud for many 
businesses and individuals has followed that growth. Many businesses are utilising the cloud for some, or all of 
their data needs, including platforms, software and infrastructure such as their corporate databases. The 
advantages are many with cheaper access to software that may be prohibitively expensive to purchase, the latest 
iterations of operating systems and other software for no extra fee and the ability for employees to access the 
same data from anywhere in the world. One drawback of cloud-based data for organisations is that they store all 
their corporate data in one place controlled by a third party. This single point for a company’s data may also be 
attractive for the nefarious hacker who targets the data for malicious destruction, modification or theft.  
 
The cloud computing spending in the overall IT industry is expected to increase greatly by the end of 2017. In a 
recent report published by Gartner in the year 2016 and cited by Cooke, it is predicted that the worldwide 
spending on the cloud is expected to grow by 18% by the end of 2017. The expected investment in the cloud 
computing industry is approximated to reach a total of US$247 billion dollars, up from US$209 billion dollars in 
2016. A major share of this is expected to come from IaaS and PaaS. A growth of 37% is projected in 2017 in 
IaaS and PaaS and SaaS which is expected to grow by 20% in 2017 (Viveca Woods, 2016) (Cooke, 2016). 
However, whilst the corporations are enjoying the many benefits of cloud-based services, the forensic 
investigators are finding these same services provide significant challenges to forensic investigations. Firstly 
there may be legal hurdles to overcome to gain access to the cloud-based data. Whilst the Budapest Convention 
on Cybercrime has seen many nations agree to cooperate in seizing and sharing of data, many countries have 
resisted signing up to the agreement amongst concerns over bypassing the usual checks and balances of privacy 
and security provided by the law, including New Zealand. The legal process in some countries may be extremely 
challenging and time-consuming and when time-constraints exist, both for time-critical investigations but also to 
prevent deletion of evidence, this alone can foil an investigation. If the legal hurdles can be overcome, then the 
next challenge is to have access to the data. Usually this will reside on one or many hard drives on a cloud server 
residing in an often undisclosed location in the world. The investigator may have to trawl through terabytes or 
more of information looking for the evidence required. This ‘logical’ view of the data is not what is normally of 
interest as often the best evidence has been recently deleted. Therefore, a ‘physical’ view of the evidence, which 
is a direct bit by bit copy of the hard drive(s) is much preferred. This forensic image often allows the investigator 
to locate and recover deleted files. However, there is currently little ability to do this rather than attempt to copy 
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the entire logical image of the hard dive or drives to the investigator’s computer using the Internet. This is a 
relatively slow process and with the very large hard drives that are common in the cloud may not be practical. 
What is urgently required is the ability to perform the investigation on the data whilst it remains in the cloud, and 
this includes the forensic acquisition of the image as well as the locating and recovery of the evidence. This 
research attempts to show, through development of new software in the form of a bash script that can be 
uploaded to the cloud, that acquisition and analysis of data in the cloud is possible and realistic.  
The following section discusses the cloud environment and the options available to users. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The cloud offers a ‘shared responsibility model’ which describes the responsibilities of the parties involved. This 
shared responsibility model generally has three main parties involved, the cloud provider, the service provider 
and the service consumer. A cloud provider represents an entity which is responsible for providing and building 
the infrastructure for running cloud-based services. The cloud providers are generally the owners of the 
infrastructure where the services are set up. A service provider is an entity which is responsible for running 
services, applications and provides an interface for the end-users to use. A service consumer is the entity which 
utilises the services provided by the service providers (Mohamed Al Morsy, 2016). 
Forensic investigations follow accepted practices to ensure that the evidence acquired retains its integrity and can 
be presented in a court of law if necessary. Whilst guidelines exist on the finer points of acquiring and analysing 
evidence the basic investigation process includes seizing the device, examining the data recovered for evidence, 
analysing the evidence for probative value and finally reporting and presenting the evidence in a sound manner 
(NIST 2006).   
 
The digital forensic guidelines provided by NIST, ACPO and other law enforcement agencies cannot at this 
stage be extended to the cloud environments as they only describe how to perform examinations on the 
infrastructure where they have physical access to the evidence. These guidelines do not mention the steps that 
need to be taken by examiners while conducting investigations in a distributed environment such as that of the 
cloud. This lack of a cloud-specific framework on how to perform investigations in the cloud has made it 
difficult for the examiners to conduct examinations in the cloud (Rani & Geethakumari, 2015). Several 
researchers have suggested using a combination of various existing frameworks for conducting investigations on 
the cloud. A widely used combination is that of NIST and the McKemmish framework where the acquisition and 
recovery is performed in the same phase followed by examination, analysis and reporting. This combination does 
aid an investigation but still does not guide an investigator on how to perform investigations in the cloud (Rani 
& Geethakumari, 2015). 
 
The current most common commercial forensic tools such as EnCase and FTK do not provide the functionality 
to perform investigations on the cloud and require administrator permissions to access the data (Alqahtany, 
Clarke, Furnell, & Reich, 2016). These extra permissions that are pose a threat as these agents need to be trusted 
for transferring confidential data from the cloud to the local server (Rani & Geethakumari, 2015). Tools such as 
Oxygen Forensic Extractor have been found to be successful in examining the evidence acquired from a 
distributed computing environments but it has also been observed that it cannot be used for performing 
acquisitions on the cloud environment (Rani & Geethakumari, 2015). The trust factor required by tools that can 
acquire an image but then necessitate downloading the image to a local computer means they have failed to 
penetrate the cloud forensics industry (Dykstra & Sherman, 2012). 
 
A framework called 'The integrated conceptual digital forensic framework for cloud computing' is a combination 
of the framework proposed by NIST and McKemmish. The NIST framework proposes a four step forensic 
approach including data collection, examination, analysis and reporting (Mell & Grance, 2014). The Mckemmish 
framework consists of the identification of the digital evidence, the acquisition of the digital evidence, the 
analysis of digital evidence and the preservation of the digital evidence (McKemmish, 1999).While the NIST 
framework focuses on the examination and reporting of the data, the McKemmish framework focuses of 
identification and preservation of the evidence and is an iterative framework which focuses on the identification 
of the source of the data for the examination (Martini & Choo, 2012).  
 
The California Fire Assistance Agreement (CFAA) model proposed a central command and control server 
responsible for performing all the forensic activities on the cloud (Alqahtany et al., 2016). This proposed 
framework aims at solving the restrictions of cross-border data privacy and security laws that exist in a cloud 
environment by providing them with a platform deployable on the cloud itself (Sibiya, Venter, & Fogwill, 2015). 
For a trusted third party to be able to perform forensic investigations on the cloud, they have to be given access 
to the cloud environments and also have to be verified by both the cloud service providers and the customer 
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whose cloud infrastructure they will be accessing for performing examinations which is a serious drawback. 
(Meera, Alluri, Powar, & Geethakumari, 2015). The majority of these guides fail to address the concern of the 
efficiency of the tools and frameworks (Casey, Katz, & Lewthwaite, 2013).  
 
What is required is an efficient solution that will address the legal and technical issues involved in cloud 
forensics. This research attempts to do this by describing the development of custom-designed software that can 
be uploaded to an organisation’s cloud-based data centre as a file that will be accepted onto the cloud. The file is 
a custom-written script that performs 2 distinct operations. Firstly, it acquires an image of the partition, hard 
drive or possibly multiple hard drives, and secondly it processes that image by analysing it for the desired files, 
including deleted files. These files may be documents, graphics or any other file that the examiner chooses to 
look for.  
 
The efficiency is present because the acquisition and recovery of the evidence is done at the same stage in the 
cloud. The acquired image is then sent into a data stream which accepts the evidence as input and then runs a 
recovery and generates a directory containing extracted data. The software runs an automated phase for 
examination and analysis of the extracted data to improve the efficiency by reducing the time required for 
performing an examination, as this is a desirable feature of forensic software (Casey et al., 2013). It was 
expected that performing the acquisition and analysis in the cloud would be very efficient as there is no data 
transfer time required until the recovered files are downloaded after the forensic processes have completed. 
The following section describes the experimental setup and testing of the new software.  
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
This research focuses on the Linux-based environments as according to Amazon, more than half a million 
servers running on AWS are Linux (Amazon Web Services, 2017a). The software was designed and developed 
on the Ubuntu operating system version 14.04.01. The scripting language used for developing this software is 
bash scripting with 1400 lines of code and the automation platform uyilises cssh. Amazon Web Services (AWS) 
was selected as reports published by Gartner and Forbes state that currently AWS is the leading cloud service 
provider in the market as discussed by Cooke (Cooke, 2016). The Cloud offers its users the option to choose an 
operating system from a wide range of distributions such as Microsoft Windows Servers, Linux Servers 
including Ubuntu Server, Red Hat Enterprise Linux, Suse Linux and CentOS. This type of flexibility makes it 
easy for the customer to deploy a hybrid infrastructure much more easily on the cloud than with local on-premise 
infrastructure.  
 
Furthermore, once the user has selected the operating system, the cloud service provider offers an option of 
selecting the configuration of the server based on the purpose of the deployment. Each server has a 10GB hard 
disk, so that multiples of 10GB must be acquired and analysed. For example, the single server required a 10GB 
acquisition, 2 servers requires 20GB and 3 servers 30GB. The timings of these acquisitions and analysis can then 
be used as a guide for forensic investigators who can multiple the time taken to then calculate the time required 
for larger disks. For example, the timing of 10GB on a single server is multiplied by 100 if the hard disk in the 
cloud is a single server with 1TB, and so forth. The RAM and CPU configurations range from a minimum of 512 
MB of RAM and 1 vCPU  to a terabyte of RAM and 128 vCPU's.  
The software was tested and developed on the T2 series of server models offered by Amazon Web Services. The 
software was developed and tested on the three of the biggest models offered by the T2 series, T2.large, 
T2.xlarge and T2.2xlarge. These three server models were tested against all the server models offered by T2 
family of Amazon web services. The client nodes that used were as follows t2.micro, t2.small, t2.medium, 
t2.large, t2.xlarge, t2.2xlarge. Each model represents servers with different hardware configurations. Each server 
was tested against all the client nodes for benchmarking the performance of the server to identify the most 
optimal server.  
Each experiment involved uploading the script to the cloud where the target data resides. Then the script was 
executed which acquired a forensic image of the selected partition. Once the image was acquired, a forensic 
analysis was made. This involved extensive keyword searches for both logical files and deleted files. The results 
were compared against each other using the time required to perform the actions as a comparison. Each 
experiment was run 18 times, as this gave an acceptable but manageable number of iterations to manage and 
average that was then used for the final result. 
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RESULTS 
The first experiment involved testbed-1. The tested server is t2.large and is equipped with 8GB of RAM and 4 
vCPUs. Six different client nodes were tested ranging from t2.micro to t2.2xlarge. The next experiment, testbed-
2, utilised t2.xlarge with 16GB of RAM and 8 vCPUs. Similar ranges of client nodes were used. Finally, the 
third testbed, testbed-3, was T2.2xlarge with 32GB of RAM and 8vCPUs with similar ranges of client nodes. It 
was felt that this would give a good comparison in performance for the client nodes with the increasing ability of 
the server to process the information.  The number of client servers present during a given iteration varied from a 
single server to a maximum of three servers during the experiments. Figure 1 shows the time taken to acquire the 
image using T2 Large. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: T2.large acquisition results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: T2.large data recovery results 
Figure 2 shows the results for a data recovery performed on this image whilst it resides in the cloud. The results 
from sever T2.large tested against the 6 client nodes with 1 to 3 servers indicate that the more servers available 
the slower the time to acquire an image. Generally, a linear decrease in time is seen across all clients as they 
move from micro through to t2.2xlarge. Image time remains approximately the same for all client nodes. Table 1 
expands on these acquisition results by showing the T2.large server tested against the T2.large client in its 3 
differing configurations.  
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Table 1: Server T2.large with client nodes T2 
Client node configuration No. of servers Time taken to acquire forensic image 
 
 
T2.large 
1 5 minutes 3 seconds 
2 6 minutes 2 seconds 
3 6 minutes 22 seconds 
 
 
T2.xlarge 
1 4 minutes 23 seconds 
2 4 minutes 47 seconds 
3 5 minutes 20 seconds 
 
 
T2.2xlarge 
1 3 minutes 30 seconds 
2 4 minutes 40 seconds 
3 5 minutes 9 seconds 
What is clear is that predicting the time taken from the number of servers cannot be done precisely but a 
reasonable estimate of the time required is possible. This may be useful when acquiring the image as it is 
desirable that the data is not be modified by users when the image is acquired. Figure 3 shows the results from 
acquiring an image when utilising T2.xlarge as the server.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: T2x.large acquisition results 
The next step is to recover data from the forensic image and the time taken to complete this task with 1-3 servers 
is shown in figure 
4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: T2.xlarge acquisition results 
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Figures 3 and 4 indicate that as the servers utilised are more powerful in terms of increased RAM and virtual 
CPUs, the time required to acquire an image and recover data from the image decreases significantly.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: T2.2xlarge acquisition results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: T2.xlarge acquisition results 
Figures 5 and 6 show that an increase in RAM and vCPUs lead to increasing efficiency in acquisition and data 
recovery. The time decreases from using the less powerful T2.large but not significantly.  The results obtained 
from running the experiment with central forensic server as t2.large model showed that t2.micro took the most 
time for acquiring images and recovering data. The quickest client node was t2.2xlarge. The average time 
required to acquire images from the client nodes was between 4 minutes and 6 minutes. The results also showed 
that in order to acquire the evidence more efficiently the server performs best with client node running 
t2.2xlarge. Further, while recovering data from the acquired images it was found that t2.2xlarge performed the 
best when the server was configured as t2.large. While identifying the most efficient server model for this 
software deployment, it was found that the time difference between the most efficient node and the other two 
nodes is minimal. While the results of the test cases show that t2.micro was the slowest performing client node, 
t2.2xlarge was the most efficient client node for performing recovery and a combination of t2.2xlarge, t2.large 
and t2.small was identified as the most efficient for acquisition. T2.2xlarge was the identified as the most 
efficient model having 8 vCPU's and 32GB of RAM, the highest configuration server amongst the three. 
The average time taken to acquire the image and perform recovery is shown in table 2. This shows that 
t2.2xlarge is the best performing server of the 3 tested. This increase in efficiency is measured by time and given 
as a percentage compared to the baseline.  
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Table 2: Percentage difference from benchmark T2.2xlarge 
 
Client node configuration 
 
No. of servers 
Time difference for 
acquisition (in percentage) 
 
 
T2.micro 
1 149% 
2 157% 
3 159% 
 
 
T2.small 
1 143% 
2 146% 
3 157% 
 
 
T2.medium 
1 146% 
2 138% 
3 133% 
 
 
T2.large 
1 144% 
2 129% 
3 123% 
 
 
T2.xlarge 
1 125% 
2 102% 
3 103% 
 
 
T2.2xlarge 
1 100% 
2 100% 
3 100% 
 
DISCUSSION 
It can be seen from the performance of the script in the cloud that acquisition and recovery times are a few 
minutes for 10GB hard drives, and even expanding this to 30GB with 3 servers requires only a relatively small 
increase in time of up to 50%, something that is still very acceptable. As more servers are added, the time 
increases by a small amount and this follows the configuration changes for the client nodes, where more 
powerful nodes consequently reduce the time for acquisition and recovery but only by a relatively small amount.  
Therefore, the results indicate that performing a data acquisition followed by file recovery is possible in the 
cloud. Further, the increased efficiency by performing these actions whilst the data remains in the cloud means 
that this type of forensic process could realistically be performed on very large hard drives. Whilst the time to 
acquire and recover files could take many days or more, this may be of little concern if the primary concern is to 
recover the forensic evidence. The alternative and more usual practice of gaining physical access to the hard 
drive(s) is likely not possible in a cloud environment. Legal issues, especially present in many countries where 
the data may be stored, along with Internet speeds that are simply too slow to transfer terabytes or more of data, 
mean that traditional recovery is often not realistic. Additionally, downloading a large amount of data in an 
acquisition and then recovering a small amount of data that is of interest means that most of the data is of no 
value to the investigator. Overall, results indicate that this process has significant benefits for forensic 
investigators, and whilst more development is required to expand its use to more platforms, services and 
configurations, the basic concept shows significant promise. 
CONCLUSION 
The cloud continues to see extensive growth and acceptance by organisations and individuals, especially as 
faster Internet speeds are offered globally. However, the challenges posed to forensic investigators by this 
technology are not keeping pace with the developments of cloud technologies. Currently, the legal, technical and 
other practical challenges make forensic investigations of cloud-based data extremely difficult and therefore 
often unsuccessful. These results show that these challenges can largely be overcome by deploying this type of 
software in the cloud alongside the forensic data sought by the investigator. The results of these experiments 
show that this is an effective and efficient method for collecting forensic data as no data transfer is required 
during the process, other than downloading the recovered files of interest once the processes have completed. 
Whilst this software is sufficient to perform the forensic processes in the tested environment, many different 
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services running different hardware and software configurations exist in the cloud. Therefore, continued 
development of this type of software is required so that all services on all platforms can be investigated in this 
manner, leading to timely and effective forensic data gathering by investigators around the world.  
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Abstract 
Electronic discovery (also written as e-discovery or eDiscovery) and digital forensics are processes in which 
electronic data is sought, located, secured, and processed with the expectation that it may be used as evidence in 
legal proceedings. Electronic evidence plays a fundamental role in many aspects of litigation (Stanfield, 2009). 
However, both eDiscovery and digital forensic approaches that rely on the creation of an index as part of their 
processing are struggling to cope with the huge increases in hard disk storage capacity. This paper introduces a 
novel technology that meets the existing and future data volume challenges faced by practitioners in these areas. 
The technology also addresses the concerns of those responsible for maintaining corporate networks as it does 
not require installation of ‘agents’ nor does it have any significant impact on network bandwidth during the search 
and collection process, even when this involves many computers. The technology is the embodiment of a patented 
process that opens the way for the development of new functionality, such as the detection of malware, compliance 
with corporate Information Technology (IT) policies and IT auditing. The technology introduced in this paper has 
been incorporated into a commercial tool called ISEEK that has already been successfully deployed in a variety 
of environments. 
 
Keywords: digital forensics; eDiscovery; data acquisition tools; hybrid forensics 
INTRODUCTION  
Electronic evidence plays a fundamental part in many areas of litigation. In the digital forensic arena, the 
traditional tools that rely on creating bit-by-bit copy images of devices and then creating an index of their contents 
are now struggling to cope with the huge increase in hard disk storage capacity seen in recent years (Jusas, 
Birvinskas, & Gahramanov, 2017). This issue is also present in eDiscovery situations where practitioners typically 
deal with corporate servers and large numbers of computers (Sondhi, & Arora, 2016). It has therefore become 
clear that innovation is urgently required if two fundamental aspects of litigation, digital forensics and eDiscovery, 
are not to impede the legal process through their inability to handle modern volumes of datai. 
Both digital forensics and eDiscovery begin with the forensic acquisition of data that may be used as evidence. 
For that data to be ‘reliable’, and therefore admissible, Steel (2006) provides three conditions:  
 1. The data acquired were from the indicated source 
 2. The data acquired were collected using proven tools and techniques 
 3.  The data have not been altered since the time of acquisition. 
To cope with increasing data volumes, digital forensic practitioners are increasingly resorting to creating ‘logical 
containers’ (holding a collection of files and directories) rather than bit-by-bit forensic images. This is very like 
the collection activity associated with eDiscovery, where the need to process large amounts of data, typically 
across a network connection, has earned this practice a reputation for being slow, cumbersome and expensive 
(Sondhi, & Arora, 2014) 
Time is always a critical factor in digital forensics and eDiscovery, not only in relation to the court process itself 
but also in relation to the extent of the disruption caused to those entities involved in collecting data as part of 
litigation (Adams, Hobbs & Mann, 2013). 
In the remainder of this paper, we detail further problems for the collection of electronic data. We discuss current 
approaches in eDiscovery and digital forensics and identify some of their fundamental limitations. We then 
propose a new Hybrid Forensics approach to address these problems together with a practical tool called ISEEK. 
We include some test results from ISEEK deployment in a Windows domain environment and finally summarize 
Proceedings of the 15th Australian Digital Forensics Conference 19
the state of development of ISEEK and comment on other potential uses based on feedback from its deployment 
in the field. 
PROBLEMS WITH TRADITIONAL FORENSIC DATA ACQUISITION 
Our experience leads us to believe that, due to the slowness of the process, the creation of bit-by-bit images is 
practical in only a limited number of cases and that the situation is getting worse given the growth in disk storage 
capacity (Quick & Choo, 2014), (Franke et al., 2017). The current eDiscovery approach, while also suffering due 
to the growth in data volumes, is far from being robust. It requires significant human involvement and relies on 
the creation of indexes that have the potential to miss evidence by, amongst other issues, failing to recognise 
foreign languages, excluding ‘noise words’ and by introducing word length restrictions. These issues are covered 
in more detail under the following headings of Acquisition Speed and Indexing.  
Acquisition Speed 
In one of our experiments, a series of tests was conducted using virtual machines and virtual disks configured in 
an ‘ideal’ situation (i.e. not having to compensate for hardware factors), using a representative selection of forensic 
imaging tools. These tools were compared for their relative speed to acquire a forensic image of the 160GB source 
diskii. The results were split into two sections, one section for those tools that could boot into a write-blocked 
environment (listed in Table 1) and another for those that required some form of separate write-blocking to prevent 
alteration of the source data (listed in Table 2). 
 
The results shown in Tables 1 and 2 display a wide range of completion times for creation of the forensic images. 
These results suggest that, assuming the same speeds were maintained, even the fastest tool would take almost 
two hours to acquire a forensic image of a 1TB disk (Table 1 - IXImager) while the slowest tool would take over 
6 hours (Table 2 – EnCase Forensic Imager) even when ignoring issues such as the time to boot a machine or 
having to remove the disks to attach them to a write-blocking device. 
 
1. Collection Test – Tools Not Requiring Write-Blocker or Dongle 
 
Tool Time                 Image Size            Image Type 
IXImager 17 min. 78.6 GB ASB 
Adepto 56 min. 149 GB RAW 
EnCase LineN 1 hr 3 min. 149 GB EO1 
Raptor 1 hr 9min 68.3 GB EO1 
 
 
2. Collection Test –   Tools Requiring Write-Blocker or Dongle   
 
Tool Time                   Image Size        Image Type 
X-Ways Forensic 27 min. 74.4 GB EO1 
FTK Imager 50 min. 149 GB EO1 
EnCase Forensic 
Imager 1 hr 14 min. 149 GB EO1 
 
 
Indexing 
In digital forensics, after data acquisition, the next stage is typically to index all the data contained in the forensic 
image to speed up subsequent searching. When the indexing process was originally developed, the storage 
capacity of a typical hard disk drive was around 100GB, but now disk drives of 8TB are not uncommon. 
Unfortunately, the speed of disk storage devices has not kept up with increasing storage capacity meaning that the 
indexing of a forensic image might take days, even with high-performance processors. In addition, the massive 
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size increase in the subsequent index files themselves now means that a robust database management system is 
required to handle them. 
 
Index engines do not recognize (and therefore process) all file types that they come across, and because they tend 
to determine file type using the file extension they could also be fooled by a malicious user who has changed the 
file extensions on files they wished to hide.  
 
In addition to having to recognize the file type, because indexes are based around collections of characters 
(typically words), adding items to an index is only meaningful when it is possible to identify strings of symbols 
as discrete words or ‘related sequences of characters’ within a block of source data. That entails not only being 
able to properly decode all the file types in the data to be indexed, but also managing to identify the words or 
related sequences of characters contained in those files. This causes problems when faced with foreign languages 
that do not contain word breaks, i.e. where words do not necessarily have white space characters between them. 
 
To increase speed and reduce index size, indexing algorithms typically ignore white space and ‘noise’ charactersiii, 
so the process to retrieve responsive documents may become more complicated in situations where the search 
term includes either of these features. For example, a sentence such as “Mary had a little lamb” will not exist as a 
single index entry but is broken up into the separate words requiring the user to find them individually or else put 
together expressions, for instance by seeking for the word “Mary” within so many words of “lamb”. Tools may 
also place limitations on the length of the words they process to manage the size of the index. Typically, a lower 
limit of 4 characters is imposed, but this excludes many words that can place a sentence in context. With upper 
limits set to some arbitrary level, key terms might be excluded such as foreign names, chemical and drug 
designators. In addition, some words that in English are considered ‘noise’ words and are therefore excluded from 
the index may be ‘significant’ words in another language. 
SPECIFIC ISSUES FOR EDISCOVERY 
eDiscovery tools typically connect to the ‘live’ data stored on devices accessible via a network, then create a 
central index to identify where the data of interest resides. This could be carried out manually with a digital 
forensics tool, but in an eDiscovery context there are likely to be large numbers of custodians and the requirement 
for a forensic practitioner to physically set up every instance of data indexing is impractical at the outset, both 
from the perspective of the amount of time it would take and the logistics of managing a significant number of 
separate collections.  
 
Many of the leading eDiscovery tools came from existing digital forensics tools that were modified. For instance, 
Guidance Software added ‘agents’ to their forensic tool. These agents are small applications that have to be 
installed across networked systems and that serve as an interface between the central indexing machine and the 
disks attached to individual computers on a network. These agents also provide a connection to a management 
system that controls multiple indexing and collection processes. This concept of using agents has been replicated 
by other developers. 
 
The idea of having agents installed on custodian computers that generate an index and collect data to a central 
secure point seems logical. However, in practice the fundamental flaws with this approach have become apparent. 
Notwithstanding all the limitations of an index approach mentioned earlier, the administrators of networks are 
now reluctant to adopt a process that requires them to install software across these networks, especially when they 
know that they will cause a large volume of traffic to be generated and could potentially interfere with normal 
business operations. In addition, given the pressures placed on litigants to meet strict court deadlines, the time 
required to create an index of data across a large number of systems has become a significant issue for in-house 
legal teams. 
HYBRID FORENSICS APPROACH 
The technology exists to overcome the difficulties discussed in previous sections. Rather than imposing 
restrictions and limits on the search and collection process, it is possible to provide more functionality with greater 
speed and greatly reduced processing costs. 
 
Traditional approaches to both digital forensics and eDiscovery have focused on a central processing point and 
have also relied heavily on indexing. With advances in virtualization technology it has been possible to develop 
an application that runs inside its own virtual environment situated entirely in memory iv. This enables the 
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application to be distributed across an unlimited number of target machines for true parallel processing as each 
instance is self-contained with no central dependencies. Another advance in technology has provided the ability 
to search the raw data on a storage device without relying on the operating system to provide access to files, 
meaning that normally ‘locked’ files, such as email containers, can be processed. This ability to process email on 
the custodian machine is a significant benefit given the key role email now plays in litigation.  
 
Combining these two developments provides the ability to carry out parallel processing across a large domain 
while significantly reducing the volume of data being transported across the network compared to that involved 
in the ‘remote agent and indexing’ model. 
  
The Hybrid Forensics approach combines the concept of remote collection of data from multiple sources 
concurrently (as in eDiscovery) with the collection of the types of data that are generally only important in a 
digital forensics investigation, e.g. registry information. The key to implementing the Hybrid Forensics approach 
is an independent collection tool with the ability to undertake literal string searches at a disk level (rather than an 
operating system level) with the code running entirely in memory on each custodian. This provides five significant 
benefits: 
1. Deployment is fast, easy and doesn’t require the participation of custodians 
2. Only responsive data is ever moved across the network, thus greatly reducing the impact on the host 
organisation 
3. The search process is much more effective and will find responsive material missed by the index 
approach 
4. The speed of collection is greatly increased as all processing and collection is carried out in parallel 
rather than individually or in small batches 
5. Remote collections on non-networked machines becomes possible. 
THE HYBRID FORENSICS APPROACH APPLIED TO DIGITAL FORENSICS 
The Hybrid Forensics approach directly addresses three key problems: that of dealing with large data storage 
devices, acquiring data from multiple systems concurrently and remotely acquiring data with minimum resources 
at the endpoint.  
 
By design, a bit-by-bit digital forensic image captures the entire contents of a data storage device including deleted 
and unused space. While it is possible to compress these data, the image is still likely to be too large to be 
transmitted across a network, especially if more than one image is involved or the data are from a file server or 
NAS device. The process also requires either that the device is removed from the source computer or that the 
computer is booted into a digital forensic environment to create the image. Both processes require the hands-on 
involvement of a digital forensic practitioner. 
 
In some cases, the data of interest can be obtained from a selection of well-defined data types depending on the 
nature of the investigation, whether these are email (both application-specific and webmail), user files, certain 
system files (including the registry on Microsoft Windows machines) or deleted files. Hybrid Forensics caters for 
the collection of all these artefacts. The collected data can be sent to an encrypted container on a device physically 
attached to the target system while it is still in use. Alternatively, the data can be sent to an encrypted container 
located on a network share or even to the cloud. 
 
The Hybrid Forensics process can be repeated across as many systems as necessary. These processes run in parallel 
utilizing the resources of the host systems. Remote collections can be undertaken by: 
1. using a deployment agent such as EasyDeploy to run PSExec instances on networked systems that 
will load and execute the hybrid tool 
2. sending a disk containing the hybrid tool plus its configuration file to one or more users at the remote 
site where it can be replicated and deployed as necessary by a system administrator or consultant with 
the appropriate access. The data will be sent to a specified target location.  
3. sending the hybrid tool plus its configuration file to a system administrator at the remote site who can 
deploy the tool from a network share and login script or by using PSExec. 
4. a system administrator using an RDP session to connect to the remote systems to deploy and run the 
tool manually. 
5. sending a webpage link to selected users for them to download the executable and config files together 
with instructions for running the tool. 
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THE HYBRID FORENSICS APPROACH IN PRACTICE 
Following the award of a patent for the Hybrid Forensics processv an application and its associated configuration 
and extraction tools have been developed. The suite of tools includes ISEEK-Designer (which creates an encrypted 
configuration file containing the search/collection containers) and ISEEK-Explorer (which opens the encrypted 
containers in which are stored the audit results and collected data for viewing and further processing). The 
deployed search and collection tool itself has been named ISEEK. 
 
The collection process for digital forensic acquisition and that for electronic discovery now appear very similar 
because with the new methodology the only difference is how the search and collection tool is configured. The key 
differences between the two applications are: 
 For digital forensics, the collected artefacts tend to be complete directories, system files and 
entire email containers. For eDiscovery, only a limited number of specific files or emails will be 
collected. 
 For digital forensics deleted files are likely to be recovered; these are rarely required for 
eDiscovery. 
 For digital forensics, there will always be data collected from each system, whereas for 
eDiscovery there may be no items meeting the conditions for collection. 
 
In both digital forensics and eDiscovery collections the configuration files, collected data and logs are encrypted so 
no aspect of the process is revealed to any unauthorised person who may come into possession of these files. 
 
The ISEEK tool has already been deployed in several instances. In one case, several server farms were searched 
for data relating to a significant lawsuit in the United States. The entire process was completed with 5 hours whereas 
a previous attempt using conventional tools was cancelled after several days with no outcome. This case involved 
searching for terms that were unsuitable for an indexing approach as they included several foreign language terms 
(including Japanese) coupled with strings of characters that would typically be excluded in an index. 
 
Another case involved a subpoena relating to the emails of 17 bank employees. Following estimates of 3 months 
to complete the work of identifying relevant emails across approximately 4 TB of data using the existing 
technology, ISEEK was deployed by two bank employees and within 48 hours they had collected and processed 
27,000 relevant emails. 
 
ISEEK is currently being deployed by a large US government contractor, a US military defence agency and a multi-
national aerospace company. 
TESTING 
An experiment to demonstrate the effectiveness of the new process and technology was carried out using 9 
custodian systems running a combination of Windows 10 Pro, Windows 10 Enterprise, Windows Server 2012 
and Windows Server 2016 in a Windows domain. 
Using the deployment utility, nine instances of ISEEK were started on the custodian systems in 48 seconds. 
ISEEK was configured to locate and collect (to a network share) files and emails containing two search terms 
that were in the “c:\users” path. The terms were: “Fuld & Company” and “489,628 Dth/d". Both terms are 
contained in files and attachments to emails within the Enron email data set. 
Each custodian system had a mixture of large and small files of various types, including PST, ZIP and HTML. 
Three of the custodian systems were ‘seeded’ with a PST from the Enron email data set. Each target system had 
either 2GB RAM (workstations) or 4GB RAM (servers). 
The results of the test are shown in Table 3. 
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3. Results of ISEEK deployment to nine custodian systems in a Windows domain 
 
For comparison purposes, a digital forensics tool that employs an index engine was used to create an index of 
the same data searched by ISEEK on the custodian system WIN-1. From Table 3 the entire process took just 
under 4 mins for ISEEK to complete. However, it took 51 mins for the forensics tool to index the same data on 
the remote system from an i7 8-core system with 12.5GB RAM and creating the index on a local solid-state 
drive.  
In addition, having created an index, the forensics tool was unable to locate the search terms in the same form as 
that provided to ISEEK, which had completed the whole process on all nine custodian systems in under 30 
minutes (with two of those systems containing responsive items processed in under 4 minutes). 
Network utilisation peaked at 32Mbps during the process (which included the RDP traffic for monitoring the 
activities). 
Further development is underway to create an integrated deployment application and refine the configuration 
options by grouping some of them under specific headings, such as the creation of a Forensics tab.  
 
For eDiscovery scenarios, a bulk extraction utility creating XML metadata output together with the collected files 
for ingesting into a review platform is being refined as well as an API allowing direct access to the encrypted 
containers for a review platform. A pilot project has already been successful involving the direct import of ISEEK 
data into the Ringtail review platform. 
CONCLUSION 
ISEEK has been developed to the stage where it has been used in various environments. The virtualization 
technology employed has opened the way for the development of further uses with ISEEK, such as processing 
Windows registry hives for artifacts relevant to security and malware investigations. Conversations with large 
consulting firms have also identified a potential role for ISEEK in IT compliance engagements, ranging from simply 
checking licence details of installed software to identifying the presence of confidential documents being stored 
outside of authorized locations. 
 
Users have identified the key benefits of the Hybrid Technology used in ISEEK as being that: 
 the tool does not need to be installed 
 the tool does not impact the network infrastructure 
 ‘live’ email can be searched and collected without requiring the users to stop working 
 the tool can run without the need for any user assistance (or knowledge of the process) 
 the process of search and collection is much faster than using alternative methods. 
Machine Searched 
data 
Responsive 
data 
Number of 
files searched 
Responsive 
Files 
Responsive 
Emails 
Time to 
complete 
WS-1 527 MB 0 3,578 0 0 00:00:45 
TRID 14 GB 0 3,772 0 0 00:02:53 
WIN-2 9 GB 22 MB 84,259 57 10 00:03:21 
WIN-1 13 GB 45 MB 239,017 114 20 00:03:53 
ROD 25 GB 0 3,996 0 0 00:05:06 
DESK-5 15 GB 0 411,187 0 0 00:08:28 
TIG 21 GB 0 6,372 0 0 00:10:18 
XF 33 GB 0 9,345 0 0 00:16:38 
DESK-4 26 GB 12 MB 548,780 20 4 00:26:12 
Proceedings of the 15th Australian Digital Forensics Conference 24
REFERENCES 
 
Adams, R; Hobbs, V. & Mann, G. (2013). The Advanced Data Acquisition Model (ADAM): A process model for 
digital forensic practice. Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, 8(4): 25-48. doi: 
https://doi.org/10.15394/jdfsl.2013.1154.  
Franke, K. & Årnes, A. (2017). Challenges in digital forensics. In A. Årnes (Ed.), Digital Forensics (pp. 313-317). 
Chichester, England: John Wiley & Sons. 
Jusas, V., Birvinskas, D., & Gahramanov, E. (2017). Methods and tools of digital triage in forensic context: 
Survey and future directions. Symmetry, 9(4), 49. doi:10.3390/sym9040049 
Sondhi, S., & Arora, R. (2014). Applying lessons from e-Discovery to process Big Data using HPC. Paper 
presented at the 2014 Annual Conference on Extreme Science and Engineering Discovery Environment, 
Atlanta, GA, USA. July 13-18, 2014. New York, NY, USA: ACM. 
Sondhi, S., & Arora, R. (2016). Big Data processing in the eDiscovery domain. In R. Arora (Ed.), Conquering big 
data with high performance computing (pp. 287-307). Cham: Springer International Publishing. 
Stanfield, A. (2009). Computer forensics, electronic discovery and electronic evidence. London, England: Reed 
International Books. 
Steel, C (2006). Windows forensics: The field guide for conducting corporate computer investigations. 
Indianapolis, IN: Wiley Publishing. 
Quick, D., & Choo, K-K, R. (2014). Impacts of increasing volume of digital forensic data: A survey and future 
research challenges, Digital Investigation, 11(4) : 273-294. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.diin.2014.09.002 
i https://www.legaltechnology.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Corporate-Litigation-and-eDisclosure-
Current-Trends-and-Future-Challenges.pdf. 
ii Available at https://www.slideshare.net/RichardAdams3/forensic-imaging-tools-draft-v1-24228558 
iiihttps://help.kcura.com/9.2/Content/Recipes/Searching__Filtering__and_Sorting/Using_Stop_Words_and_M
aking_Some_Characters_Searchable_in_a_dtSearch.htm 
iv For further information on the technology visit https://turbo.net/ 
v http://www.google.com/patents/US8392706 
Proceedings of the 15th Australian Digital Forensics Conference 25
ANALYSIS OF ATTEMPTED INTRUSIONS: INTELLIGENCE 
GATHERED FROM SSH HONEYPOTS 
 
 
Priya Rabadia, Craig Valli, Ahmed Ibrahim, Zubair Baig   
Security Research Institute, Edith Cowan University, Perth, Western Australia 
p.rabadia@ecu.edu.au, c.valli@ecu.edu.au, ahmed.ibrahim@ecu.edu.au, z.baig@ecu.edu.au 
 
 
Abstract 
Honeypots are a defensive cyber security countermeasure used to gather data on intruder activities. By analysing 
the data collected by honeypots, mitigation strategies for cyberattacks launched against cyber-enabled 
infrastructures can be developed. In this paper, intelligence gathered from six Secure Shell (SSH) honeypots is 
presented. The paper is part of an ongoing investigation into analysing malicious activities captured by the 
honeypots. This paper focuses on the time of day attempted intrusions have occurred. The honeypot data has been 
gathered from 18th July 2012 until 13th January 2016; a period of 1,247 days. All six honeypots have the same 
hardware and software configurations, located on the same IPv4/24 subnet. Preliminary analysis of the data 
from all six hosts has been combined to show the number of attempted intrusions recorded by each honeypot and 
the top 20 countries attacking IP addresses have originated from. However, there is a variation in the number of 
attempted intrusions recorded on each of the six hosts. Findings from the research conducted suggest, there is a 
pattern of organised attempted intrusions from attacking IP addresses originating from China and Hong Kong 
during an 8am to 6pm working day. An additional investigation into the possible use of organised attacking 
workforces was conducted. 
Keywords:  Cybersecurity, SSH, Secure Shell, Honeypots 
INTRODUCTION 
Honeypots are decoy systems used to gather data on attempts made to gain unauthorised access to IT systems. 
There are three main types of honeypots that can be deployed. Firstly, a low-interaction honeypot is a system 
with minimal functionality and interaction with the actual honeypot. The configuration process is simple, with 
minimal maintenance required to sustain the honeypot. Secondly, a high-interaction honeypot. This system 
emulates a fully functional ‘real’ system; with an extensive configuration process. Due to the configuration of 
the system the maintenance and interaction required is demanding (Zemene & Avadhani, 2015). The final type 
of honeypot is a medium-interaction honeypot; it emulates some functionalities of a ‘real’ system. The 
configuration process is simpler than a high-interaction honeypot but the maintenance required is more 
demanding than a low-interaction honeypot (Zemene & Avadhani, 2015). An example of a medium-interaction 
honeypot is a Secure Shell (SSH) honeypot named Kippo (Desaster, 2013). 
Kippo SSH is an application specific honeypot that imitates some functions that are exhibited by a ‘real’ SSH 
system to the attacker. SSH is designed to securely transmit data using a point to point encrypted tunnel. Kippo 
honeypots are designed to collect various data from attacks propagated against the SSH service (Rabadia & 
Valli, 2014). An open-source, python 2.7 based event-driven program called Twisted libraries 
(TwistedMatrixLabs, 2013) is deployed by the Kippo honeypot to imitate and project a legitimate SSH session to 
the attacker. Data for this study has been acquired from identically configured Kippo SSH honeypots, using 
Ubuntu 11 Long Term Support (LTS) servers as their base operating system. All the honeypots were located on 
inexpensive Virtual Private Servers (VPS) The six honeypots are referred to as: Bobtail, Bronx, Dugite, Goanna, 
Magpie and Mopoke. Three of the honeypots were based in the United States (Bobtail, Magpie and Mopoke) 
with the other three located in the Netherlands (Bronx, Dugite and Goanna.) 
Preliminary analysis was conducted on the combined data from all six honeypots: the number of attempted 
intrusions recorded by each honeypot and the top 20 countries attacking Internet Protocol (IP) addresses have 
originated from. The focus of this research was on the time of day (24-hours) attempted intrusions had occurred. 
This paper is part of an ongoing investigation into data collected from Kippo SSH honeypots, with work 
conducted over the past five years 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015 (Rabadia & Valli, 2014; Valli, 2012; Valli, 
Rabadia, & Woodward, 2013, 2015). An attempted intrusion is an unauthorised attempt to gain access or control 
of a honeypot.  
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Figure 1 - MySQL database structure for Kippo honeypot, adapted from  Valli, (2012) 
Overview of the Honeypot setup 
Kippo honeypots are designed to collect data from attacker interaction with the emulated SSH service. The 
emulated SSH service is provided by an open-source, Python based event-driven program called Twisted 
(BruteforceLabs, 2011; TwistedMatrixLabs, 2013). Twisted provides the libraries that are utilised and deployed 
by Kippo honeypot to imitate a valid “encrypted” SSH session to an entity (BruteforceLabs, 2011). The Kippo 
honeypot also emulates a fake file system to present to the attacker, along with, false system reporting Kippo 
allows interaction with artefacts such as /proc/cpuinfo or .bash_history log file. The level of deception in the 
default setting is limited however, this functionality however, is able to be expanded and modified at will. For 
this experiment key elements were modified such as /proc entries and different bash file entries to deceive 
attackers. 
The Kippo SSH honeypots are written in Python with a simple installation process. Source code was obtained 
from the kippo.googlecode.com Wiki (Code.google.com, 2012). The setup for these particular systems used in 
the data collection was conducted as specified by the BruteForce Lab Guide (BruteforceLabs, 2011). This 
deviates from the original Kippo SSH documentation and uses the authbind daemon instead of twistd as the 
initial connecting daemon for the service. The configuration lets authbind handle the binding of the twistd as a 
non-root user to a low numbered TCP port and passes this to the Kippo daemon. This configuration has been 
found to be more consistent, reliable and secure during the conduct of the research project. 
During the installation process a local MySQL database was configured securely to record all the interactions 
with the Kippo honeypots. Figure 1, reproduced from Valli (2012), shows the MySQL database structure used in 
the Kippo honeypots to record all the interactions.  
After recording to the local MySQL database, these data were then transmitted to a centralised PostgreSQL SQL 
server that was running a Debian-Linux operating system (Valli et al., 2013). Communication is achieved using 
a Python extension that uses a PostgreSQL driver to connect to the SURFIDS system IDS logging server (IDS, 
2013; SURFcertIDS, 2013). The centralised logging server utilises the SURFIDS system for storing the data 
from the honeypots into an aggregated PostgreSQL database. The database has functions and tables specifically 
for the Kippo honeypots data. Since 2013 however, Elasticsearch has also been used to consume data from the 
honeypots in addition to recording with SQL.  
In addition, on the honeypots that run Kippo the researchers also operate Dionaea (TheHoneynetProject, 2011) 
and Glastopf (MushMushFoundation, 2011) which also report to the database instances, however these data are 
not used in this analysis for this research.  
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 
Analysis conducted on the total number of attempted intrusions on each of the six honeypots and the top 20 
countries attacking IP addresses have originated from is presented. An attempted intrusion is an unauthorised 
attempt to gain access or control of a honeypot.  The data used in this study was collated from the sessions tables 
of the honeypot dataset, shown in Figure 1. The data used in this investigation has been collected from 18th July 
2012 until 13th January 2016; this is a period of 1,247 days. Table 1 shows the number of attempted intrusions 
and the geolocations of the honeypots. A total of 5,554,680 attempted intrusions have been recorded, with the 
host known as Mopoke recording the most at 1,399,203 attacks. Host Goanna has received the least number of 
attacks at 520,250 as shown in Table 1. 
 
Honeypot 
Attempted 
Intrusions Geolocation 
Bobtail  934,966 United States 
Bronx  1,319,381 Netherlands 
Dugite  1,064,723 Netherlands 
Goanna  520,250 Netherlands 
Magpie  316,157 United States 
Mopoke  1,399,203 United States 
Total  5,554,680  
 
Table 1: Number of attempted intrusions and the geolocation of the honeypots. 
Using the combined data from all six honeypots, the country of each attacking IP address session had been 
compiled using IP to ANS Mapping (TeamCymru, 2016) an open-source application that uses netcat. The top 20 
countries attacking origin IPs was compiled and represented in Table 2. From 5,554,680 total attempted 
intrusions recorded; 31,596 unique attacking IP addresses have been identified attempting to gain unauthorized 
access to the six honeypots. Each host records the geolocation of the connections origin; however, this may not 
indicate the actual origin of the intruder attacking the hosts if the attacker is using a proxy. Data gathered from 
all six honeypots show ~64.47% of the recorded attacks originate from Chinese IP addresses followed by 
Romanian, Hong Kong, United States and France respectively as represented in Table 2. 
 
 Countries Attempted 
Intrusions  
1 China 3,581,114 
2 Romania 708,793 
3 Hong Kong 427,209 
4 United States 360,606 
5 France 99,161 
6 South Korea 90,983 
7 Germany 34,253 
8 Taiwan 19,906 
9 Brazil 19,260 
10 Ukraine 19,113 
11 Russia 18,644 
12 India 14,930 
13 Indonesia 14,925 
14 Czech Republic 13,999 
15 Turkey 13,904 
16 Japan 12,488 
17 United Kingdom 12,066 
18 Mexico 11,897 
19 Canada 10,975 
20 Italy  8,961 
Table 2: Top 20 originating countries of attacking IP addresses 
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INTELLIGENCE GATHERED 
In this section, the time of day attempted intrusions occurred for each of the six honeypots is investigated, and 
the combined dataset is presented. RStudio Version 1.0.136 (RStudio, 2016) was used to examine the honeypot 
datasets. The start time of the attacking IP sessions was used as opposed to the end time, as the research 
investigates the number of attempted intrusions occurring during a 24-hour day. Next, the date part of the 
timestamps was stripped, leaving only the time segment. Each time segment was rounded to the nearest 15-
minute interval. As hourly analysis would result in 24 data points and analysis conducted using 15 minute 
intervals resulted in 96 data points utilised. Allowing for a substantial data trend to be analysed, furthermore a 
reduced time interval could result in the data trend being hidden. The frequency of each 15-minute interval was 
compiled and depicted in Figure 2 to Figure 7. Once individual graphs for all six honeypots had been generated. 
The data from all six honeypots were combined and a graph was generated as shown in Figure 8.  
Records of the interaction for each honeypot were stored in a combined MySQL database, the structure of which 
is shown in Figure 1. As the nature of the research requires an analysis of the timestamps; maintaining the 
timestamp throughout the data collection and data analysis phases of the research was essential for the purpose 
of validity. To ensure the integrity of the timestamp data recorded on all six hosts are consistent, the Network 
Time Protocol (NTP) is used to sync all six hosts to GMT +8 time.   
Attempted Intrusion Detected on the Honeypots  
Figure 2 shows the time of day (24-hours format) using GMT+8 time as datum, for attempted intrusions that had 
occurred for the host known as Bobtail located in the United States. The highest recorded number of hits is at 
04:15 with 11,495 attempted intrusions and the lowest number of hits recorded is at 14:45 with 45 with 9,122 
hits. There is a significant decline in the number of attempted intrusions occurring after 12:00 until 00:15, with 
hits under 9,500. Whereas between 00:15 to 11:45 the number of intrusion attempts are above 10,000. This steep 
decline is clearly shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Time of day (24-hours) attempted intrusions occurred, for Bobtail. 
Unlike Bobtail, the host known as Bronx shown in Figure 3, does not have a steep decline in the number of 
attempted intrusions recorded. Instead Bronx has a steady decline in the number of attempted intrusions 
throughout the day (24-hours). The highest recorded number of attempted intrusions is at 8:00 with 14,752 
recorded and the lowest recorded at 21:45 with 12,899 hits. There is a steady decline in the number of hits 
recorded after 08:00 until 22:00, where the number attempted intrusions steadily increase again. 
 
Figure 3: Time of day (24 hours) attempted intrusions occurred, for Bronx. 
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Similar to Bobtail (Figure 2), Dugite has a steep decline (Figure 4) in the number of attempted intrusions. The 
highest recorded attack is 12,222 at 7:30 and 14:00. With the lowest recorded hit at 17:00 with 10,186 attempted 
intrusions recorded. The steep decline in the number of attempted intrusions were recorded between 14:30 and 
00:00, with around 10,500 and below. Whereas between 00:15 and 14:30 the number of hits were above 11,000. 
This is similar to the findings in from Bobtail. 
 
 
Figure 4: Time of day (24 hours) attempted intrusions occurred, for Dugite. 
The host known as Goanna shown in Figure 5 has a steep decline in the number attempted intrusions similar to 
Figure 2 and Figure 4. The decline in the number of attempted intrusions starts 11:15 and continuous until 00:00. 
The number of attempted intrusions during this time are under 3,000. Most attempts occur between 00:15 and 
11:00 with over 3,600 recorded attempts.  The highest recorded number of attempted intrusions is 4,050 at 
02:00, and the lowest number recorded is 2,718 at 17:15.  
 
 
 
Figure 5: Time of day (24-hours) attempted intrusions occurred, for honeypot known as Goanna. 
Figure 6 is from the Magpie host, it is similar to Bobtail, Dugite and Goanna as there is a steep decline in the 
number of attempted intrusions recorded. However, the number of attempted intrusions is mostly consistent 
throughout the day at around 5,500. There is a short decline from 20:45 until 23:45 with 4,700 recorded. The 
highest recorded attempted intrusions are at 8:45 with 6,371 hits recorded and the lowest at 23:00 with 4,529 hits 
recorded.  
 
Figure 6: Time of day (24 hours) attempted intrusions occurred, for Magpie. 
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Host Mopoke shown in Figure 7, has the highest recorded number of attempted intrusions with 15,625 at 07:00, 
and the lowest number of hits recorded with 13,714 at 21:45. Mopoke, has similarities to Magpie, as there is a 
steep decline in attempted intrusions for a short time period compared to the other honeypots. The decline in the 
number of attempted intrusions recorded is from 19:30 until 00:00, with majority of the hits recorded below 
14,000. While between 00:15 and 19:15 the number of hits are recorded above 14,500, showing Mopoke and 
Magpie had similar trends in the number of attempted intrusions.  
 
Figure 7: Time of day (24 hours) attempted intrusions occurred, for Mopoke. 
Figure 8 is the combined data from all six honeypots; the mean line shows there is a steady decline in the 
number of attempted intrusions recorded. Whereas, the individual hosts aside from Bronx had a clear decline in 
the number of attempted intrusions recorded throughout the day (24-hours). The highest recorded number is at 
8:00 with 60,219 and the lowest at 14:00 with 56,188 recorded. The mean line illustrates the number of 
attempted intrusions recorded increase during the hours between 00:15 and 09:00 and thereafter decreased. 
Summary 
Findings from the data above suggest the number of attempted intrusions fluctuates as the day progresses. With 
Bobtail, Dugite and Goanna having similarities in a steep decline in the number of attacks from use times only. 
Whereas, Magpie and Mopoke only had a steep decline in the number of hits for a short period of time. Bronx 
and the mean from combined dataset show a steady decline in the number of attempted intrusions throughout the 
day.  
Table 3 summaries the findings from all six honeypots including the combined dataset. As shown in Table 3, all 
means between 00:00-11:59 are higher than the means between 12:00-23:59 and the mean hits for a day. 
Additionally, all the peak numbers have occurred early in the timeline, while the minimum numbers have 
occurred later in the timeline. 
 
Figure 8: Time of day (24 hours) attempted intrusions occurred, for the combined hosts. 
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Table 3: Summary of the findings 
Honeypot  Geolocation Mean hits 
for a day 
Mean 
between   
00:00-
11:59 
Mean 
between   
12:00-
23:59   
Peak 
Time 
Peak 
Hits 
Minimum 
Time 
Minimum 
Hits 
Bobtail United States 9,780 10,287.29 9,272.71 04:15 11,495 14:45 9,122 
Bronx Netherlands 13,756.18 14,145.42 13,366.94 08:00 14,752 21:45 12,899 
Dugite Netherlands 11,115.53 11,547.75 10,683.31 07:30 12,222 17:00 10,186 
Goanna Netherlands 3,295.292 3,768.25 2,822.33 02:00 4,050 17:15 2,718 
Magpie United States 5,435.98 5,563.583 5,308.38 08:45 6,371 23:00 4,529 
Mopoke  United States 14,689.52 14,800.25 14,578.79 07:00 15,625 21:45 13,714 
Combined   58,072.5 58,407.23 57,737.77 08:00 60,219 14:00 56,188 
 
Table 4: Summary of honeypot datasets excluding attacking IP addresses from China and Hong Kong 
Honeypot  Geolocation Total 
number 
of hits 
Mean 
hits for a 
day 
Mean 
between   
00:00-
11:59 
Mean 
between   
12:00-
23:59   
Peak 
Time 
Peak 
Hits 
Minimum 
Time 
Minimum 
Hits 
Bobtail United 
States 
341,777 
 3,560.18 3,502.94 3,617.42 11:45 5,521 05:15 1,962 
Bronx Netherlands 343,386 3,576.94 3,689.42 3,464.46  02:00 5,347 06:00 2,172 
Dugite Netherlands 205,860 2,144.38 2,178.15 2,110.6 11:45 3,325 07:45 283 
Goanna Netherlands 15,402 160.44 166.73 154.15 08:45 845 09:45 0 
Magpie United 
States 
197,113 
2,053.26 1,729.4 2,377.13 20:00 3,917 12:45 240 
Mopoke  United 
States 
463,093 
4,823.89 4,535.54 5,143.76 12:00 8,120 07:15 2,812 
Combined   1,566,631 16,319.07 16,111.29 16,526.85 23:45 18,858 01:30 12,485 
 
Figure 9: Combined dataset of mean time of day attempted intrusions have occurred excluding attacking IP 
addresses originating from China and Hong Kong. 
DISCUSSION 
Preliminary analysis was conducted on the data collected from all six honeypots; the number of attempted 
intrusions recorded by each of the honeypots was presented. Mopoke recorded the most activity at 1,399,203. 
Among the top 20 countries where attacks originated (Table 2), IP address from China comprised about 65% of 
the attacks. 
The mean from the complete datasets for all the honeypots show the mean between 00:00-11:59 is higher than 
the mean between 12:00-23:59. From the findings it is suggested that the geolocation of the honeypots may not 
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determine when attempted intrusions are carried out, as Bobtail (United States), Dugite (Netherlands) and 
Goanna (Netherlands) showed similar activities. However, Magpie and Mopoke were both located in the United 
States and similar activities had been identified. This mean indicates the global or distributed nature of these 
observed attacks. 
The observation made from the data represented in the previous section suggest the number of attempted 
intrusion decrease as the day progresses. The honeypot datum is GMT+8 time. As shown in Table 2 attacking IP 
address originating from China and Hong Kong are first and third respectively. To verify whether there is a 
linkage between the decline in activity as the day progresses and attacking IP addresses originating from China 
and Hong Kong additional experiments had been conducted. IP addresses from China and Hong Kong had been 
removed from the individual honeypot datasets as well as the combined dataset.  
Table 4 represents data from the honeypot datasets with attacking IP addresses originating from China and Hong 
Kong excluded. The honeypots located in the United States and the combined dataset have a higher mean for the 
hours between 12:00-23:59 as opposed to the mean for the hours between 00:00-11:59 and the mean for the 
whole day, unlike Table 3. Whereas, the honeypots located in the Netherlands have a higher mean for the hours 
between 00:00-11:59. The peaks   are spread over the day, Table 3 shows peak occurring between 02:00-08:45, 
while Table 4 shows times between 02:00-20:00 and 02:00-23:45 when including the combined dataset. In Table 
3, all minimum hits have occurred between 12:00-23:59 but Table 4 shows all minimum hits have occurred 
between 00:00-11:59 aside from Magpie with the minimum number of hits occurring at 12:45, suggesting the 
use of organised attacks. 
 
Table 5: Summary of honeypot datasets from attacking IP addresses from China 
Honeypot  Geolocation 
Mean 
hits for a 
day 
Mean 
between   
00:00-
07:59 & 
17:00-
23:59 
Mean 
between   
08:00-
16:59 
Mean 
between   
00:00-
08:29 & 
17:30-
23:59 
Mean 
between 
08:30-
17:29 
Mean 
between   
00:00-
08:59 & 
18:00-
23:59 
Mean 
between   
09:00-
17:59   
Mean 
between   
00:00-
07:59 & 
18:00-
23:59 
Mean 
between   
08:00-
17:59 
 
Bobtail 
United 
States 
5,731.99 5,819.28 5,586.5 5,882.92 5,480.44 5,898.52 5,454.44 5,879.93 5,524.88 
Bronx Netherlands 9,225.43 8,900.83 9,766.42 8,905.15 9,759.22 8,896.6 9,773.47 8,853.48 9,746.15 
Dugite Netherlands 7,733.6 7,745.08 7,714.44 7,823.62 7,583.56 7,880.12 7,489.39 7,831.86 7,596.03 
Goanna Netherlands 3,295.29 3,346.82 3,209.42 3,381.3 3,151.94 3,419.5 3,088.28 3,387.77 3,165.83 
Magpie 
United 
States 
2,339.97 2,205.67 2,563.81 2,242.12 2,503.06 2,253.97 2,483.31 2,214.82 2,515.18 
Mopoke  
United 
States 
9,137.96 9,239.28  8,969.08  9,243.05  8,962.81  9,236.08  8,974.42  9,241.25 8,993.35 
Combined   37,303.27  37,256.13  37,381.83  37,243.62  37,402.69  37,235.85  37,415.64  36961.95 37781.13 
 
 
The trends observed with the datasets including the attacking IP addresses from China and Hong Kong are not 
present when excluding these attacking IP addresses. Figure 9, depicts the mean for time of day and the number 
of attempted intrusions made for the combined dataset excluding attacking IP addresses originating from China 
and Hong Kong. Unlike figure 8, figure 9 does not have a distinct trend of a steady decline as the day progresses. 
There are many clear peaks and troughs throughout the day in figure 9 as opposed to figure 8. The trend of the 
number of attempted intrusions made decreases as the day progresses is present in the datasets including the 
Chinese and Hong Kong attacking IP addresses however it is not depicted in the datasets with these attacking IP 
addresses excluded. 
Further investigation into the suggestion of organised attacker workforces being deployed by countries such as 
China has been conducted. The mean of the number of attempted intrusions occurring during the “average 
working day” ranging of hours between 08:00-17:59 were compared to the mean for the hours outside this range. 
By comparing the means of the number of attempted intrusions occurring between the “average working day” 
08:00-17:59 and outside these specific hours of 00:00-07:59 then 18:00-23:59, it could be suggested organised 
attacks are being deployed within the working day. Table 5, shows the results from the analysis conducted. An 
“average working day” consisting of hours between 08:00-16:59, 08:30-17:29, 09:00-17:59 and 08:00-17:59. 
From the information shown in Table 5, only Bronx, Magpie and the combined dataset suggest presence of 
organised attacks being deployed. However, none of the means of the “average working day” for Bobtail, 
Dugite, Goanna and Mopoke are higher the means for the remainder of the day. Further investigation is needed 
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as Bronx and Magpie suggest the possible presence of organised attacks using workforce being deployed by 
countries such as China. 
CONCLUSION 
The focus of this research was analysing the time of day attempted intrusions have occurred, the datum for this 
was GMT +8 time. The findings from this research show, the complete datasets from all six honeypots have a 
decline in the number of attacks as the day progressed through GMT +8 time. Three trends had been identified: 
 A steep decline in the number of hits in the afternoon with the lower number of hits sustained between 
00:00-11:59 GMT +8 time.  
 A steep decline in the number of attacks, the decline in activity was for a shorter time period and much 
later in the day.  
 A steady decline throughout the day.  
Investigating further into the trends identified, all attacking IP addresses originating from China and Hong Kong 
were excluded. The observed trends in the complete dataset where not present in the dataset with the excluded 
attacking IP addresses. The honeypots located in the United States have a higher mean for the hours between 
12:00-23:59, whereas the honeypots located in the Netherland have a higher mean between 00:00-11:59. Unlike 
the complete datasets, all honeypots including the combined dataset had higher mean hits recorded between the 
hours of 00:00-11:59. Further investigation is needed to determine the significance of geolocation in the 
attempted honeypot intrusions. Upon the findings suggesting there is a linkage between time of day and 
attacking IP addresses originating from China and Hong Kong, additional investigation was conducted into the 
use of organised attacking work forces by countries such as China. The mean for the “average working day” was 
compared to the mean of hours outside the specify time. Analysing the results shown in Table 5, Bronx, Magpie 
and the combined dataset suggested the uses of organised attacking workforces being deployed as all four shifts 
had a high mean then the remainder on the day. However, the observation was not present in the remaining 
honeypots. Further research needs to be conducted as Bronx, Magpie and the combined dataset suggest the use 
of organised attacks during a working day by counties such as China.  
 
Future work 
In future work, further analysis will be conducted on the Kippo SSH honeypot datasets. The time of day attacks 
have occurred for each of the top attacking countries including China and Hong Kong will be investigated which 
could yield an explanation in the decline of attacks as the day progresses. Also, data on the attacking IP 
addresses will be explored further, to identify if a distinct pattern for attacking IP addresses originating in the 
same geographical location is present. Analysis will also be conducted into suggestions of organised attacks 
during “business hours” workforces being deployed. Further investigation is needed to determine the 
significance of geolocation in attempted honeypot intrusions, this can be achieved by deploying honeypots in 
different geographical locations. 
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Abstract 
Image steganography and steganalysis techniques discussed in the literature rely on using a dataset(s) created 
based on cover images obtained from the public domain, through the acquisition of images from Internet sources, 
or manually. This issue often leads to challenges in validating, benchmarking, and reproducing reported techniques 
in a consistent manner. It is our view that the steganography/steganalysis research community would benefit from 
the availability of common datasets, thus promoting transparency and academic integrity. In this research, we have 
considered four aspects: image acquisition, pre-processing, steganographic techniques, and embedding rate in 
building a dataset for image steganography. 
Keywords: Dataset, Image Steganography, Steganalysis, Embedding Rate 
INTRODUCTION 
Common datasets are widely used in different domains such as Image Processing, Artificial Intelligence, Cyber 
Security, etc. Some popular examples include FVC2002 (Maio, Maltoni, Cappelli, Wayman, & Jain, 2002) used 
in biometrics, PhysioBank Databases (Goldberger, et al., 2000) consisting of physiological datasets, and UCI KDD 
datasets (Hettich and Bay, 1999) used in data mining. Common datasets that are publicly available allow 
researchers to validate, benchmark, and reproduce techniques previously reported or proposed, thus promoting 
transparency and integrity of academic research. 
We have carefully chosen the title of this paper as a “dataset for image steganography” in order to scope our work 
to only images. Thus, we would like to define a steganographic dataset as follows:  
“A steganographic dataset is a collection of media objects consisting of cover objects and corresponding 
steganographic objects, with variations in parameters related to the objects and steganographic techniques 
used, applied consistently across all objects”. 
In our definition, objects may include digital file types such as text, image, audio, and video. Therefore, this paper 
only focuses on image steganography dataset. Additional terms such as cover objects, steganographic objects, and 
relevant parameters are discussed in detail in later sections of this paper.  
To the best of our knowledge, there are no such datasets for image steganography. Thus datasets used in existing 
literature have been constructed typically by the authors using public domain images. However, we argue that 
using public domain images introduces the risk of the integrity of such images being compromised, as absence of 
steganographic content is not known a priori.  
The next section provides a detailed background on concepts that influenced our decisions in building the dataset. 
This section is followed by the method, which outlines the experimental design and further details on activities 
that were carried out in each step of the experiment. The paper is then concluded with final remarks and avenues 
for future direction. 
BACKGROUND 
Steganography first emerged as a form of covert communication thousands of years ago employing techniques 
such as using invisible ink to hide a message in plain sight or masking secret messages within inconspicuous text 
(Pieprzyk, Hardjono, & Seberry, 2003). Different forms of secret communication have evolved through the 
centuries into two specific sciences, cryptography and steganography. Cryptography deals with rendering a secret 
message unreadable to anyone other than the intended recipient. In contrast, steganography hides the existence of 
the secret message within cover objects such as text, image, audio, or video files. An unsuspecting party would 
not be aware of the presence of a secret message even if they came to possess the file. However, if the presence of 
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the secret message were discovered, then the goal of steganography would be defeated. This form of discovery, 
attack, or detection, is formally known as steganalysis. 
This section informs the reader with background information about factors in the literature that influenced the 
criteria and methodology for creating the dataset for image steganography. We identified four key factors as: image 
acquisition, pre-processing, steganographic techniques, and embedding capacity. 
Image Acquisition 
Three aspects of image acquisition that stood out from the literature were its source, type, and quantity. 
Image acquisition 
Three sources were predominantly used throughout the literature were: 
1. public domain image datasets, 
2. downloading images from public domain Internet sources, and 
3. manually acquiring images. 
The image datasets available in the public domain cited in the literature were NRCS (Pevny et al., 2010; Huang et 
al., 2010; Ker, 2005), Greenspun (Aycibas et al., 2005; Farid, 2002; Fridrich, 2004; Lyu & Farid, 2002), and 
ImageNet (Zeng et al., 2016) Freefoto (Lyu & Farid, 2004) and the use of stock photo or clip-art compilations 
(Huang, et al., 2010). However, Ker (2004) purchased the rights to the galleries used within his research.  
In order to download images from Internet sources, Kharrazi et al. (2006) used web crawlers to scrape publicly 
available images. Others used established steganographic sources including the BOWS2 (Pevny et al., 2010) and 
BOSSBase (Kodovsky & Fridrich, 2013) databases. 
According to Holotyak et al., (2005) and Pevny et al. (2010), both the original source and quality of the images 
can affect the effectiveness of steganalysis. Thus, some researchers developed their own image datasets, which 
allowed them to have control over the images used for their specific needs, for example, using multiple image 
capture sources to more closely reflect real-world application (Holotyak et al., 2005; Huang et al., 2010; Pevny et 
al., 2010). 
Types of Image 
The types of images used can be classified as either natural or unnatural images. Farid and Lyu (2003) defined 
natural images as photographs collected during standard or digital photography, allowing them to mimic real-world 
application of steganography. Within the same paper, they defined unnatural images as artificial images that have 
been created digitally. Additionally, Fridrich and Goljan (2002) discussed the suitability of types of images and 
proposed that cover images with low colour counts or unnatural images (e.g. digital art) should be avoided. This 
view is seemingly supported as there is an identified gap in the literature for images of these types. 
Number of images 
The number of images used varies drastically between the types of research conducted, with most literature 
exploring steganalysis techniques using quantities between 1,000 and 10,000 cover images (Aycibas, Kharrazi, 
Memon, and Sankur, 2005; Farid, 2002; Farid and Lyu, 2003; Fridrich, 2004; Holotyak, Fridrich & 
Voloshynovskyy, 2005; Huang, Shi & Huang, 2010; Ker, 2004; Ker, 2005; Kodovsky & Fridrich, 2013; Kodovsky, 
Pevny & Fridrich, 2010; Lyu & Farid, 2002; Pevny, Bas & Fridrich, 2010; Solanki, Sarkar & Manjunath, 2007). 
However, Zeng et al. (2016) argued that these numbers were not sufficient to represent real-world application and 
used 14,000,000 unique images of varying complexity from the ImageNet database instead.  Other large quantities 
used in literature range from 40,000 (Lyu & Farid, 2014) up to one million (Kharrazi, Sencar, & Memon, 2006) 
unique cover images.  
Conversely, literature that explores early steganalysis techniques (Fridrich and Goljan, 2001; Fridrich, Goljan, and 
Du, 2001) or new steganographic models are shown to use smaller cover image sets comprising of 10 or less 
images (Solanki, Sarkar & Manjunath, 2007; Zhang, Jiang, Zha, Zhang, & Zhao, 2013)  
While these examples show that the number of images used vary between experiments, it is important to note that 
the literature does not discuss how the number of cover images may impact operational or acquisition costs, or if 
these factors have influenced the author’s decisions. 
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Pre-processing 
Pre-processing is used during the development of each image dataset to ensure consistency in the characteristics 
of the images used. This section explores how JPEG compression quality, resolution cropping, image complexity, 
and colour palettes are changed or observed during dataset creation. 
JPEG Compression and Quality 
One of the largest factors that affects the reliability of steganography within the JPEG domain is the original 
compression quality of the cover image. (Holotyak et al., 2005; Ker, 2005; Lyu & Farid, 2004; Pevny et al., 2010). 
When each JPEG image file is modified or saved, it undergoes lossy compression where it is compressed by 
stripping the image of imperceptible information, including fine details and colour gradients. In his book, Miano 
(1999) describes the four steps taken during JPEG compression as being: 
1. downsampling Red Green Blue (RGB) colour palette to its luminance and chrominance components 
(YcbCr), 
2. Discrete Cosine Transformation (DCT), 
3. quantisation, and 
4. Huffman Coding.  
This process can make it easier for both a passive observer and steganalysis tools to detect differences within the 
image. Ker (2004) establishes the criticality of the JPEG compression process as he demonstrated higher 
susceptibility to steganalysis associated with higher compression rates. Holotyak, Fridrich, and Voloshynovskyy 
(2005) explained that this is because the compression process removed areas of high-frequency noise that would 
otherwise be used to efficiently and effectively embed the secret message. Because of this, experiments conducted 
on compressed JPEG images commonly used compression rates between 70% to 90% (Holotyak et al., 2005; Ker, 
2005; Lyu & Farid, 2004; Pevny et al., 2010) and examples where compression quality were below 60% are harder 
to find (Ker, 2004; Ker, 2005; Kharrazi et al., 2006). 
Image Cropping 
Each dataset within the literature cropped the cover image file during pre-processing, with the two most common 
resolutions used being 512x512 (Holotyak et al., 2005; Ker 2004; Walia, Jain, and Naydeep, 2010) and 256x256 
(Lyu and Farid, 2004) pixels. While other resolutions were uncommon, they did include 640x418 (Ker, 2005), 
640x400 (Farid, 2002; Ker, 2005), 780x540 (Fridrich, 2004) 900x600 (Ker, 2004), 384x256 (Fridrich & Goljan, 
2002), 1024x744 (Fridrich & Goljan, 2002), and 2100x1500 (Pevny et al., 2010) pixels. 
As the resolutions used increase, so does the file size of the resulting image. One could intuitively assume that 
larger files can be used to embed larger payloads. However, Ker (2004) has shown that the increase in acceptable 
payload size and resolution are not proportional.   
While not typically discussed within the literature, it is important to note that the cropping of images is likely due 
to the increased computational time and storage requirements that would be associated with larger images.  
Image Complexity 
While uncommon, some researchers (Liu, Sung, Xu, & Ribeiro, 2006; Lyu & Farid, 2004; Fridrich, 2004) took 
advantage of the cropping process to ensure that the areas used were consistent regarding image complexity and 
steganographic performance.  
Liu, Sung, Xu, and Ribeiro (2006) also demonstrated that image complexity could affect the performance of 
steganalysis by specifically cropping both coloured and grayscale datasets and ranking the resulting images before 
performing steganalysis. This result showed that steganalysis was generally easier in images with lower 
complexity and that standard colour images and grayscale images with low complexity were comparable for most 
steganalysis techniques.  
Colour Palettes  
Using grayscale cover images is preferred for steganography as they are harder to detect during steganalysis 
compared to its colour counterparts (Liu, Sung, Chen, and Xu, 2008). According to Holotyak, Fridrich, and 
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Voloshynovskyy (2005), this is because it is more difficult to detect the steganography in grayscale images as the 
same inter colour channel relationships found in colour images do not exist in grayscale images. This is the 
preferred view in most literature with notable exceptions such as Fridrich (1999), Fridrich and Goljan (2002), Liu, 
Sung, Xu, and Ribeiro (2006), Lyu and Farid (2004), Rabie (2015), Wu and Noonan (2012) and Yu, Chang, and 
Lin (2007). 
However, it is important to note that while grayscale is preferred in literature, real-world steganographic 
applications would include colour images and there is a lack of literature addressing colour images. Out of the 29 
datasets examined, only the 7 papers identified above discussed or compared steganography in colour images. 
Steganographic Techniques 
Among the literature review for this paper, 29 discussed separate steganographic techniques that were used to build 
our dataset and their occurrence frequency has been listed Table 1, which clearly indicates the popularity of the 
individual techniques.  
Table 1: Popularity of Steganographic Techniques 
Steganographic Techniques Frequency 
LSB 10 
Outguess 9 
F5 7 
Jsteg, Un-named 4 
Ezstego, YASS, Steghide 3 
Model-Based, s-tools, Hide4PGP, Steganos, MME3, PQ, NsF5 2 
MME2, MSS, HUGO, LSBR, BCHopt, Edged-based, MB1, PQt, Pqe, 
Lqsteg, J-UNIWARD, UERD, UED, HQIH, JPHide, MM2, MM3 
1 
It is important to note that while this data shows that most sources used multiple algorithms or tools to create their 
dataset, when they did so it was often to compare algorithms that shared similar properties. Additionally, it was 
not uncommon for a single source to use a single tool (Holotyak, Fridrich & Voloshynovskyy, 2005; Ker, 2004; 
Ker, 2005; Kodovsky, Pevny & Fridrich, 2010; Rabie, 2015; Yu, Chang & Lin, 2007; Zhang et al., 2013) 
Embedding Rate 
The literature shows that the approach used to embed the payloads often varied and explored multiple variables 
for determining the capacity used. Common methods of embedding data involved using fixed payloads based on 
the size of the image (Aycibas et al., 2005; Farid, 2002; Kodovsky & Fridrich, 2013; Liu et al., 2008) or by 
embedding the information based on the Bits Per Non-Zero DCT Coefficient (BPC) of the images (Fridrich, 2004). 
In most cases, the payload size when using these methods was a multiple of 5 and ranged between 0.05 and 1.00. 
Notable exceptions to this were Ker (2004), who used a rate of 0.03 and Zhang et al. (2013) who included rates of 
0.43, 0.61 and 0.83. 
Other methods included embedded payload images with set resolutions instead of random data to create their 
steganographic images (Farid, 2002; Fridrich & Goljan, 2002; Lyu & Farid, 2002; Lyu & Farid, 2004; Monoharan 
et al., 2015; Rabie, 2015; Wu & Noonan, 2012; Yu et al., 2007). In these cases, the secondary image resolutions 
ranged from 32x32 to 256x256 pixels. 
METHOD 
As outlined in the previous section, the methodology for this research was structured based on the four aspects of 
image acquisition, pre-processing, steganographic techniques, and embedding capacity. Additionally, we also 
included a step to validate our processes by included hashing, logging, and validation of the dataset. A conceptual 
design of the experimental procedure is illustrated in Figure 1. 
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 Image acquisition 
For the purpose of this research, the 1,760 images were acquired using a SONY DSC-W830 Cybershot camera 
(using base settings) for a duration of two months across a range of locations including public art installations, 
legal graffiti and street art zones, and public parks and buildings. Out of the final 1,000 images, 844 were taken in 
outdoor locations while 166 were taken inside public buildings. Further details of the image characteristics are 
listed in Table 2 while Table 3 provides visual examples of the types of images chosen. Lastly, during the image 
acquisition process, 760 images were discarded during the collection phase for reasons that included: 
1. Incorrect Settings: leading to higher resolution and image sizes that would be unsustainable over the 
course of the cover image and its resulting steganographic image sets. 
2. Blurry/unusable images: which would be unable to serve as an image for this purpose. 
3. Photography policies: for public places such as the Australian War Memorial (Australian War Memorial, 
2009) that we felt would not be compatible with the restrictions placed by the ethics committee approval. 
Table 2: Cover Image Characteristics 
Dimensions 640x480 
Width 640 pixels 
Height 480 pixels 
Horizontal resolution 350 dpi 
Vertical resolution 350 dpi 
Bit depth 24 
Compression Uncompressed 
Resolution unit 2 
Colour representation sRGB 
Compressed bits/pixel 4 
 
  
 
Figure 1: Conceptual Design of Experimental Procedure 
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Table 3: Cover Image Examples 
Cover Images Sample Images 
Outdoor Settings 
   
Public Art Installations 
   
Legal Graffiti Zones 
   
Indoor Settings 
   
Pre-Processing 
There were three main decisions to be made during pre-processing. These were: 
1. What cropping and offset would be used? 
2. What colour model to use? 
3. What image types would be used? 
Cropping and Offsetting 
As the literature review showed, the two most common resolutions used for cropping steganographic cover images 
were 256x256 and 512x512 pixels. As the original cover images were only 640x480, we made the decision to crop 
the cover images to 256x256 pixels, which offers the added benefit of lower processing time due to fewer pixels. 
Furthermore, since all images were acquired manually, we did not see the need to offset during the cropping 
process.  
Colour Palettes 
As the literature identified a gap in the literature regarding colour-based steganographic datasets, we decided to 
use the coloured versions of the cover images wherever possible. It is important to note though, that some of the 
steganographic algorithms used required the use of grayscale images or converted the coloured cover images to 
grayscale during the embedding process. 
As the processed cover image set does contain a set of grayscale images for the JPEG format, future experiments 
could use these files to create a compare between colour and grayscale images for JPEG steganography, which 
would assist with filling other identified gaps within the literature. 
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Image File Types 
The image file types used during the creation of this dataset were JPEG and PGM. Other popular image file types 
such as TIFF, GIF, and BMP were not used in this dataset as they were not relevant to the steganographic techniques 
used. Table 4 shows the final properties for each set of cover images used.  
Table 4: Post-Process Characteristics by Image Type 
Property Colour JPEG Grayscale JPEG Colour PGM 
Dimensions 256x256 256x256 256x256 
Width 256 pixels 256 pixels 256 pixels 
Height 256 pixels 256 pixels 256 pixels 
Horizontal resolution 350 dpi 350 dpi 350 dpi 
Vertical resolution 350 dpi 350 dpi 350 dpi 
Bit depth 24 8 24 
Compression Uncompressed Uncompressed Uncompressed 
Resolution unit 2 2 2 
Colour representation sRGB sRGB sRGB 
Compressed bits/pixel 4 4 4 
 
The pre-processing operation is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Steganographic Techniques 
The details of the steganographic techniques used during this research are summarised in Table 5 and Figure 3 
shows the steganographic embedding process followed. 
Table 5: Steganographic Techniques for Building the Dataset 
Author Algorithm or Tool Domain Input file type 
Provos, N. (2001) Outguess 0.2 JPEG JPG 
Westfield, A. (2001) F5 JPEG JPG 
Hetzl, S. (2003) Steghide 0.5.1 JPEG JPG 
DDE Lab. (2013b) J-UNIWARD JPEG JPG 
DDE Lab. (2013c) S-UNIWARD Spatial PGM 
DDE Lab. (2014) SI-UNIWARD Side-Informed PGM 
DDE Lab. (2013a) nsF5 JPEG JPG 
DDE Lab. (2012a) HUGO Spatial PGM 
DDE Lab. (2012b) WOW Spatial PGM 
Kodovsky, J. (2007) PQ Spatial JPG 
 
 
Figure 2: Pre-Processing Operation 
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 Embedding Rate 
The embedding rate originally used within the dataset is 0.20 bits per available capacity (BPAC) for each cover 
image. As the BPAC will vary between each algorithm, this number must be calculated independently for each 
tool.  
For Outguess and F5, this required embedding a small test file into each image to pull the estimated capacity from 
the tool’s output (i.e., -verbose parameter). For Steghide, this required first viewing the maximum capacity (i.e., 
using -info parameter). Once these expected capacities were known, we were then able to calculate the required 
size of the test file based on the embedding rate selected. 
For J-UNIWARD, S-UNIWARD, SI-UNIWARD, nsF5, HUGO, WOW, and PQ, the maximum embedding 
capacity is automatically calculated during the embedding process, and the only step required was using a variable 
to call the required embedding rate when executing these algorithms from the command line. 
Verification and Dataset 
Throughout the course of the experiment, various events were logged (date, time, embedding rate, and the path to 
artefact) and all individual artefacts created were hashed (MD5) for validation purpose. This allowed us to verify 
that the Cover images and Steganographic images were not the same after the embedding process and confirm that 
the exact payload could be retrieved when the tools used possessed this capability. At the end of the experiment, 
the final dataset we curated consisted of 14,000 images in total, which includes the original cover images, pre-
processed cover images, and the final Steganographic images. 
 
Figure 3: Steganographic Embedding Process 
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CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTION 
This paper has presented the process and criteria we used to build a dataset for image steganography using. During 
our research, we discovered that there were different approaches used to construct the datasets used in literature in 
relation to steganography and steganalysis.  
In our approach, we considered image acquisition, pre-processing, steganographic techniques, and embedding rate. 
During image acquisition, we chose to acquire manually using a digital camera, and used pre-processing to further 
format images to JPG and PNG, and also to crop the images to a specific resolution. Finally, we used multiple 
steganographic techniques and selected embedding rates determined consistent with each steganographic 
technique used. 
One of the limitations we encountered was during the image acquisition process. Due to onsite photography policy, 
several images captured had to be excluded from the dataset. As a result, only a small potion of the dataset (16%) 
represents indoor images. We feel that there has to be a balance between indoor and outdoor images at least, in 
order to have a true representation of real-world applications.  
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